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Copyright Revision Act and Visual
Artists*
By HAMISH R. SANDISON
Director of Art Law Research Project (Great Britain); Founding Member of
Bay Area Lawyers for the Arts; Executive Director of Bay Area Lawyers for
the Arts 1975 - 1978; B.A., Cambridge University, 1974 (Honors in Law).
Historically, copyright was usually associated with books, not
with the visual arts.' The first copyright protection was made avail-
able in England in 17092 for booksellers. It took another twenty four
years, in an Act of 1735,1 popularly known as Hogarth's Act, for that
concept of copyright-the right to copy-to be applied to the visual
arts. Hogarth's Act was named for the great English engraver and
painter, William Hogarth, about whom I'll say a little more later.
He is the hero to whom I dedicate this lecture. William Hogarth, the
first and greatest lobbyist for the arts that the world has ever known,
applied the concept of copyright to the visual arts.
Reviewing American law, beginning with the Constitutional Co-
pyright Clause,' you will see this preoccupation with concepts of
book publishing. The Act of 17901 extended only to maps, charts,
and books. Next came the Act of 1802,1 which covered historical
prints. The year 18651 marked the first protection for photographs.
Finally, in 1870,8 the Act for the first time specifically covered
"painting, drawing, chromo, statuette, statuary, and models or de-
signs of fine art."' Then came the major Copyright Act of 1909,'o the
present law, which specifically enumerated some classes of visual
* Edited transcription of a speech given at a Copyright Symposium sponsored by
COMM/ENT and Bay Area Lawyers for the Arts held at San Francisco, California on Sep-
tember 17 - 18, 1977.
1. The term "visual arts" includes paintings, prints, sculpture, and photographs.
2. Copyright Act, 8 Anne, c. 19 (1709).
3. Copyright Act, 8 Geo. 2, c. 13 (1735).
4. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
5. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
6. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171.
7. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540.
8. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
9. Id. at § 86.
10. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
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arts. Section 5, subsections (g) through (k)" covered most of what
we commonly call the visual arts.
Today we are dealing with the Revision Act, 2 and in section
102(5), the words are "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works."' I
think as we examine this subject matter more closely, we'll see an
obsession with some concepts which really don't fit the visual arts.
The concept of "publication", for example, really only makes sense
in terms of selling and distributing books, not in terms of unique
and original works of fine art. What we have to do is stretch some
of these concepts so they will extend to the visual arts, but we'll find
difficulty in that process.
I think it is important to look at why copyright is relevant for the
visual artist because many of your clients, as visual artists, will not
immediately see the importance of copyright for their work. Let us
look at copyright in two ways: one is the interest of the individual
artist and the other is the broader public policy interest.
As far as the artist is concerned, I can do no better than to quote
from a slightly earlier source, the London Daily Advertiser of June
3, 1735. I think you will see why I quote it in a moment. I'm reading
from the pamphlet that BALA" has published, "You and Your Co-
pyright."" The Daily Advertiser wrote as follows-and remember,
this is shortly before the passage of Hogarth's Act in 1735:
Several Printsellers who have of late made their chief Gain by
unjustly pyrating the Inventions and Designs of ingenious Artists,
whereby they have robb'd them of the Benefit of their Labours,
being now prohibited such scandalous Practices from the 24th Day
of June next, by an Act of Parliament, [Hogarth's Act] . . . have
resolved, notwithstanding, to continue their injurious proceedings
at least till that Time and have in clandestine Manner procured
mean and necessitous Persons to come to Mr. William Hogarth's
House, under pretence of seeing his "RAKE'S PROGRESS" in
order to pyrate the same, and publish base prints thereof before
the Act commences, and even before Mr. Hogarth himself can
publish the true ones."
11. 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) - (k) (1970).
12. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 et seq. (1976)).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1976).
14. Bay Area Lawyers for the Arts (BALA) is a San Francisco non-profit corporation which
provides a lawyer referral service for artists, sponsors educational seminars, and publishes art
related legal publications.
15. BALA, ARTs GUIDE No. 2: YOU AND YOUR COPYRIGHT (1976).
16. Id. at 1.
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That's what happened in 1735 and, believe me, that's what happens
today, only more so. Just as a sidelight, Mr. William Hogarth wrote
that passage himself-anonymously.
I read it because it illustrates very nicely the two concerns of the
individual artist. One is economic: those printsellers were making
money from Hogarth's work. The second concern is aesthetic, it
relates to what the French call the droit moral," the moral rights of
the artist: those prints were "base'' prints, they were inferior reprod-
uctions which did not reflect well on the quality of Hogarth's work.
Over 200 years later those concerns are even more significant.
First, the economic concern. Let's look at it more closely. Think
of the ways in which a painter can earn a living from his or her work.
Basically there are three kinds of income: one is from the sale of the
original painting; two is from rental of the original painting; and
three is from sale of multiple reproductions, whether in books or
posters or on postcards. In my experience, it is from the third source
that most visual artists earn most of their income.
Without copyright protection there will not be a penny accruing
for that artist from those multiple reproductions. This is the eco-
nomic issue. The aesthetic issue really reflects a turmoil that's going
on in the art world now: people involved in the art world are looking
back towards Europe for examples of protection for the visual artist.
This morning Lewis Flacks" referred to the fact that the Berne
Convention" was put in a corner. I think that the Berne Convention
is shortly to come out of its corner, particularly with respect to
moral rights. America, and forgive me for saying this, has had a
historical preoccupation with remuneration under the copyright
law, and not with the right of control. But in fact, the right of control
is capable of being exercised through copyright law, and is the clos-
est approximation we have in this country of the French "moral
right." It can manifest itself, for example, in the right to prohibit
any reproductions at all under copyright, the right to control the
quality of the reproductions, if any, or the right to control the quant-
ity. So there you have the second aspect of the artist's individual
concern.
17. The concept of droit moral protects the personal rights of authors and artists as com-
pared with the copyright which protects only their economic rights. The droit moral includes
the right to prevent deformation of the work, the right to withdraw the work from publication,
and the right of the author to require the use of his name with his work.
18. Lewis I. Flacks, the Keynote Speaker of the Copyright Symposium, is Assistant Regis-
ter of the Copyright Office.
19. The Berne Convention is an international copyright convention established in 1886.
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Then more broadly we have public policy. I think it's clear that
the purpose of the Copyright Clause20 is to promote the creative arts
in this society. Copyright royalties are both a reward for past labors
and an incentive to future creativity. Copyright royalties in the arts,
as a whole, constitute a far more important subsidy than the com-
bined budgets for the National Endowment for the Arts and the
Humanities." But within the art market as a whole, it is visual
artists who most seldom have taken advantage of copyright law. In
fact, it is my view that the health of the visual art market in this
country would benefit greatly if more artists would take advantage
of the copyright law that is available to them. I think it is our role
as lawyers, as counselors to visual artists, to explain to them how
easy it is to take advantage of copyright protection.
The first item I would like to discuss is the subject matter of
copyright. Having discussed the general provisions at some length I
don't have to belabor them. We've discussed the requirement of
"originality".22 Secondly, we have the requirement of "fixation".23
For example, there are a number of forms of performing arts that
are still capable of common law copyright protection insofar as they
are not "fixed". We're seeing-certainly I'm aware of it in the Bay
Area-a merging of the boundaries of the strictly, so-called
"performing arts" and the "visual arts" in such things as conceptual
art and performance pieces, whether static or moving. In many
cases the artistic performances have no script or are not fixed in any
way. Arguably, they are still subject to common law protection."
Thirdly, you have the general principle that copyright does not
protect "ideas" but only the form in which those "ideas" are ex-
pressed."5 This often has relevance in the visual arts. For example,
a man came to me and inquired whether he could copyright his
scheme for the use of primary colors. He wanted, in fact, to get a
monopoly on the use of red, blue and yellow. I said: "No, I'm sorry,
that's an idea. It's very nice; using primary colors is wonderful, but
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
21. The National Endowment for the Arts is a government corporation which funds artists
and art projects. The National Endowment for the Humanities, also a government corpora-
tion, promotes scholarship in the humanities through grants, loans and other forms of assis-
tance.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
23. Id. The definition of when a work is "fixed" is set out in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). See
also 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1) (1976).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1) (1976).
25. See id. at § 102(b).
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you can't copyright it. If you use your colors to paint a picture, then
you can copyright it." That distinction is still very relevant.
Let me take a little time on "useful objects"." We've already
discussed it briefly. The new law addresses this issue in the defini-
tional section of "pictorial graphic and sculptural works" in section
101,7 and also alludes to it in section 113.28 Let's take a look at
section 101. After defining pictorial, graphic and sculptural works,
it says:
Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as
their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are con-
cerned; the design of the useful article, as defined in this section,
shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if,
and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian
aspects of the article."
Compare that with section 113 which relates to another aspect of
that definition, the scope of the rights in such works. It reaffirms,
under section 113(1), that the Act "does not afford . . . any greater
or lesser rights to the making, distribution, or display of the useful
article . . . than those afforded to such works under the law,
[whether the pre-revised federal statute] or the common law or
statutes of a State . . ."30 I think this means that the great case of
Mazer v. Stein ' still has pertinence. You'll recall that that case
involved a lampstand in the shape of a female figure. This figure
had a lamp in her head and wires coming out of her feet. Mazer held
that the pictorial elements of that statue, even though functional,
were capable of copyright protection because they were separable.
It's interesting that this displays a rather baroque concept of art; if
it's ornamental it can be copyrighted but if you have a Bauhaus
style of chair that's not only beautiful but simple and functional, it
doesn't seem to be capable of copyright protection. I think that's
wrong. I advise artists generally to copyright their chairs, their
bowls, and their pottery, even though functional, and even though
not quite as baroque as the statuette in Mazer v. Stein. I let the
26. The landmark case on whether copyright protection extends to the utilitarian, rather
than artistic, aspects of a work is Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). See also 17 U.S.C. § 102(5) (1976).
28. Id. at § 113.
29. Id. at § 101.
30. Id. at § 113(b).
31. See note 26, supra.
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Copyright Office solve that problem, and, ultimately, of course, the
courts. But that relates to questions of taste. As we'll see in the next
section, taste is a no-no in copyright law. That's open to misinter-
pretation. I meant to say, of course, that copyright law is for very
tasteful people but they're not allowed to consider their tastes in
judging the issue.
Let's turn to "minimum creativity"." There are three cases we
should consider. The first case, Sarony" relates to a photograph of
none other than Oscar Wilde. I think it's very relevant to the new
law as well as to the old law. The defendant in that case, who had
blatantly infringed the photograph, argued that photographs, being
the mere product of a clicked shutter, were not works of art capable
of copyright protection. Fortunately the United States Supreme
Court rejected that view. The next case, Bleistein," relates to com-
mercial art. Let me read a sentence from the judgment: "It would
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law [let
us all remember this] to constitute themselves the final judges of
the worth of pictorial illustrations outside the narrowest and most
obvious limits [which are nowhere defined]."" Bleistein goes on to
say that some works of genius would miss appreciation, for instance,
because they were too novel." The point is that if it's commercial
and therefore involves limited labor, it is still copyrightable, outside
of those "obvious limits", which are nowhere defined. It has always
been open to the courts to hold that a mere snapshot that I take with
my little camera is not a work of art capable of protection. That has
never been decided, but we've always worked on the assumption
that mere snapshots are capable of protection. Let me also read
from Sarony, which relates to photographs. It is interesting to see
the rationale the court used. They found in holding for the plaintiff
that Oscar Wilde's photograph:
is a useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture
. . . and that plaintiff made the same . . . entirely from his own
original mental conception, to which he gave visible form by posing
the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arrang-
ing the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in said
32. See generally Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (photo-
graph); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (advertisement); Bailie
v. Fisher, 258 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (cardboard star).
33. Burrow-Giles, note 32, supra.
34. Bleistein, note 32, supra.
35. Id. at 251.
36. Id.
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photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful out-
lines, arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and
evoking this desired expression, and from such disposition, ar-
rangement, or representation, made entirely by the plaintiff, he
produced the picture in suit . . ."
In other words, here is Oscar Wilde languishing in velvet drapes and
he is very arty and therefore it is a work of art even when rendered
in a photograph. But it still raises this sort of question: Is an ordi-
nary photograph capable of protection? We'll take it that it is and
that the new law does uphold it.
There is one very low threshold beneath which the courts will not
descend. This is discussed in Bailie v. Fisher" which involved a
cardboard star. In Bailie an individual had copyrighted a little card-
board stand in the form of a star, which could hold a photograph
on it. The court said this is not a work of art; "that we're sorry, there
is no art in this cardboard star and you cannot copyright it."', Thus
there is a requirement of minimum creativity. I've never been able
to determine how to define "creativity". I advise all our clients to
go ahead and copyright. I think the watch word is "when in doubt,
copyright", and leave it to the courts to decide. But you should be
aware that that's a possible limit on copyrightability.
Let's examine the scope of the rights. Assume you have a copy-
right of a work of visual art, the "right to reproduce" is in section
106(1).10 Preparation of derivative works in section 106(2)" is rele-
vant insofar as, for example, a two-dimensional work may be re-
produced in three-dimensional form. For example, a watercolor may
be the basis for a sculpture. To "display publicly" is another exclu-
sive right in section 106(5).42 This is a curious new right that I have
not been able to figure out in the context of visual arts. Let's say
you have a painting. The right to display a painting is clearly a
valuable right. Museums and galleries depend upon it. What is the
extent of that right? Let's look at section 10911 because there is a
very significant qualification of that right.
Section 109(b) says that the owner of the work, for example, a
person to whom the work has been sold, has the right to display it
37. Burrow-Giles, note 32, supra at 54.
38. Bailie, note 32, supra.
39. Id. at 426.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1976).
41. Id. at § 106(2).
42. Id. at § 106(5). But see 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1976).
43. Id. at § 109.
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publicly." In other words, sale of the work terminates the right to
public display as far as the artist is concerned. But under section
109(c) if the work is only loaned or if the transfer is merely by rental,
lease, or something other than a sale, then the artist, the copyright
owner, retains the right of public display." What is the meaning of
the right of public display if you no longer have possession of the
work? That's not clear to me. If I were to sell a painting to the
Metropolitan Museum, they would have the right to display it;
however, if I loaned it to the Oakland Museum, I would retain the
right to display it. Now clearly that's not very helpful. I think that
contracts will have to provide who will exercise the right of display.
In the case of a loan to a museum, presumably the intent of the
contract is to grant the right of public display. But the 1976 Act is
not terribly lucid on that point.
Next we have the limitations on those exclusive rights." They
have considerable application to the visual arts. "Fair use",' reprod-
uction by libraries and archives" and exempt displays," are of great
importance in educational use of visual arts. We've already men-
tioned section 113(b) which is really another limit where a work is
lawfully reproduced in useful articles."
The copyright rights of the copyright owner do not include the
right to prevent the making and distribution or display of pictures
or photographs of such articles in connection with advertisements
or commentaries. Clearly, if I am a retailer of craft items which have
44. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1976) states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(5), the owner of a particular copy
lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled,
without the authority of the copyright owner, to display that copy publicly, either
directly or by the projection of no more than one image at a time, to viewers present
at the place where the copy is located.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (1976) states:
The privileges prescribed by subsections (a) and (b) do not, unless authorized by
the copyright owner, extend to any person who has acquired possession of the copy
or phonorecord from the copyright owner, by rental, lease, loan, or otherwise, with-
out acquiring ownership of it.
46. Limitations on the exclusive rights of the copyright owner are set forth in 17 U.S.C. §§
107 - 18 (1976).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
48. Id. at § 108.
49. Id. at § 110.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976) states:
In the case of a work lawfully reproduced in useful articles that have been offered
for sale or other distribution to the public, copyright does not include any right to
prevent the making, distribution, or display of pictures or photographs of such
articles in connection with advertisements or commentaries related to the distribu-
tion or display of such articles, or in connection with news reports.
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a utilitarian function, and the artist, the potter, for example, retains
the copyright-the right to reproduce that craft item-I am still free
to make a photograph of that piece of pottery for the purposes of
advertising the sale of that item. Lastly, section 118 provides a
system of compulsory licensing for the use of works of visual arts on
public broadcasting." Again, I'm straining to see exactly how that's
going to work out in practice.
What kinds of commercial use, in this case, non-profit use (which
I still like to think of as commercial in this context), will be made
of works of visual arts on KQED Channel 9?"2 Possibilities include
an auction where visual art is on display, cartoons, or various kinds
of programming involving works of visual art. But how licensing will
be worked out when there's no organization of visual artists with
which public broadcasters can make voluntary agreements is un-
clear. My only point in mentioning it is that all these limitations
apply to the visual arts.
Let's get into some more substantial issues for the visual artist in
ownership and transfer of copyright and look at their application to
the visual arts. First, consider the concept of "works made for
hire."" I think that is relatively clear under the new law. A pre-
Revision Act case, Scherr v. Universal Match Corp.5" illustrates the
problem for the visual artist. It's an amusing case involving two
soldiers who were commissioned by the United States Army to cre-
ate a massive statue of an advancing infantryman in full regalia
entitled, "The Ultimate Weapon." This gentleman was erected in
bronze at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Sometime later the Universal
Match Corporation began manufacturing and selling matchboxes
which had a reproduction of this statute on the cover. They were
sued by the two soldiers. It was a clear case of infringement, but the
soldiers lost. The court held that it was their employer, the United
States Army, who owned the copyright. The old law contained a
presumption that the copyright in a work for hire belongs to the
employer," not the artist; and even a copyright notice in the artist's
own name would not rebut the presumption that the employer is the
copyright owner. This was often a catch for many visual artists who
had placed notice on their work in their own names, but were in fact
employees for hire and had no rights. The soldier's notice was defec-
51. 17 U.S.C. § 118 (1976).
52. KQED-TV is the San Francisco public broadcast station.
53. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
54. 297 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
55. 17 U.S.C. & 26 (1970).
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tive because it was in the wrong name; they lost their rights forever.
Moreover, another rationale for the Scherr result is that the United
States Government cannot hold a copyright in works it has commis-
sioned or created." I think the concept of "works made for hire"
under the new Act is fairly clear. If an artist works for an advertising
agency which creates posters, those works belong to the employer.
However, in commissioned works" we have a change for the benefit
of the artist. A case that illustrates the problem is Yardley v.
Houghton-Mifflin Co." In Yardley an artist was commissioned to
create a mural on the wall of the DeWitt High School. He put his
copyright notice on the mural in the bottom left corner as advised,
no doubt, by some lawyer. The publisher Houghton-Mifflin came
along with, I believe, a coffee table book which included a reproduc-
tion of the mural. The artist lost his infringement suit because the
court ruled that where an art work is commissioned there is a pre-
sumption that the commissioning client, and not the artist, has the
right to claim the statutory copyright. In fact, what happened was
that the common law copyright had vested in the commissioning
client, and it is the person who owns the common law copyright who
is entitled to claim the statutory protection, even though the artist
had placed his own copyright notice on the mural.
If we look at the definition of "works for hire" under section 101
we find that presumption is precisely reversed; the artist now will
be the copyright owner unless there is a written instrument signed
by both parties which states that the work shall be considered a
work made for hire. Even then it must be in one of the enumerated
categories; a supplementary work, illustration, and so on." That is
56. Id. at § 8. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1976).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
58. 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939) cert. denied 309 U.S. 686 (1940).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) states:
A "work made for hire" is-
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instru-
ment signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For
the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a "supplementary work" is a work prepared
for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose
of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or
assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial
illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer
material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an "instructional
text" is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the
purpose of use in systematic instructional activities.
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a considerable improvement for the artist whose work is commis-
sioned-typically, the portraits, the murals and the like.
Lastly, another great problem which resulted in many artists los-
ing copyright protection was the sale of their work."o A very, very
silly 1942 case, Pushman v. New York Graphic Society, Inc." held
that when an artist sells a painting he or she also sells the copyright
to that painting, unless it is agreed in writing otherwise." That only
related to common law copyright. Of course, if you lost your com-
mon law rights you were no longer entitled to claim the statutory
rights; therefore, you had to be certain that you kept your common
law copyright in order to preserve your claimed statutory protection.
Many artists were unaware of the statutory protection or that they
were selling their copyright when they sold their painting. The
Pushman rule was reversed by a New York statute, 3 and more re-
cently, in 1976, by the California Civil Code's section 982,"1 with
which BALA had considerable involvement." Under the new Act,
it is very clear that both these statutes are preempted by section
301. I hear no contrary views, I assume it's very clear. By virtue of
section 301 the section of the Act that now states that a transfer of
the physical object does not constitute a transfer of the copyright
applies to an unpublished work as well as a published work." Thus
we can say that whether your painting is published or unpublished
(whatever those terms mean) you still retain the copyright under the
60. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1976).
61. 287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E.2d 249 (1942).
62. Id. at 308, 39 N.E.2d at 253.
63. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 219(g) (McKinney 1975) states:
Whenever a work of fine art is sold or otherwise transferred by or on behalf of the
artist who created it, or his heirs or personal representatives, the right of reproduc-
tion thereof is reserved to the grantor until it passes into the public domain by act
or operation of law unless such right is sooner expressly transferred by an instru-
ment, note or memorandum in writing signed by the owner of the rights conveyed
or his duly authorized agent, Nothing herein contained, however, shall be construed
to prohibit the fair use of such work of art.
64. CAL. CIV. CODE § 982 (West Supp. 1977).
65. At the invitation of its author, Assemblyman Alan Sieroty, BALA helped to write,
support, and secure enactment of A.B. 1051, which took effect on section 982 of the CAL. Civ.
CODE on Jan. 1, 1976.
66. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1976) states:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.
Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord,
in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copy-
righted work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does
transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright
convey property rights in any material object.
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new Act whether you expressly reserve it or not. In order to transfer
the copyright you must have a written agreement to do so." These
are tremendous improvements, at least for the visual artist. In some
ways they reflect the concerns that were expressed in New York and
California by their state statutes.
The question of preemption has been exhaustively discussed in
the context of transfer. A live issue right now, which also raises the
issue of preemption, is the California Resale Royalties Act of 19768
which, very briefly, provides for a royalty whenever a work of fine
art is resold within the state of California or by a California resident
for a profit and at a price of more than $1000. If those circumstances
occur, the artist is entitled to receive a royalty equal to five percent
of the gross sales price. The underlying rationale for the Resale
Royalties Act is grounded in a concept borrowed from European
legislation, the so-called droit de suite" which in some respects is
analogous to the droit moral."0 The concept of resale royalties is
analogous to an umbilical cord between the artist and his or her
work. When the physical object leaves the hands of the artist, there
is an umbilical cord comprised of two elements: First, the moral
rights, even though I've lost my painting you still can't destroy it
or mistreat it, because I have a continuing moral interest in it");
second, is the economic interest if you commercially exploit my art
work by resale I'm entitled to a continuing interest whether it's five
percent, three percent, etc"). The Resale Royalties Act is the first
expression in America of the concept of the artist's continuing eco-
nomic interest in his work after its sale. The Act has been the
subject of litigation in the Federal District Court in Los Angeles,"
in which a three judge panel was petitioned to hold the Act uncon-
stitutional on a number of grounds including preemption under the
1909 Copyright Act and the supremacy clause." The preemption
argument asserted that even under existing law the Resale Royalties
Act invades a field that has been exclusively the province of Con-
gress, and that California cannot act. I think that's plainly wrong,
67. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1976).
68. CAL. Civ. CODE § 986 (West Supp. 1977).
69. The concept of droit de suite permits an artist to receive royalties as his work passes
from buyer to buyer. See Price, Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The
Case of the Droit de Suite, 77 YALE L.J. 1333 (1968).
70. See note 17, supra.
71. The Resale Royalty Act was upheld in the case of Morseburg v. Babyon, Civ. No. 77-
2410 RMT (S.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 1978) appealed Apr. 18, 1978.
72. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Goldstein v. California13 is fairly decisive of that. However, in deter-
mining whether the Act is preempted two questions arise under
section 301 of the new law. One, is it within the subject matter of
copyright? I think clearly it is. Two, is the resale right equivalent
to the rights protected under the copyright law? Let me quote more
precisely. Section 301(1) says that " . . . all legal or equitable rights
that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright as specified in section 106 . . "f' This is the nub
of the issue with respect to preemption of resale royalties, as well
as the passage of moral rights legislation. I'm not going to give you
an answer to whether the Resale Royalties Act is preempted now;
we can debate it. It can go either way?
In Europe they refer to the concept of resale royalties as a neigh-
boring right." It's never been classified as a copyright interest. On
the other hand, I've always argued in its favor by analogy with
copyright. I get myself into deep water because I say the right to
receive a royalty on resale is analogous to the right to receive a
royalty when your play is performed for the second or third time.
In counseling visual artists notice is the single most obnoxious
aspect of copyright protection for reasons which I think will become
obvious as my talk progresses. Generally, the significance of notice
under the new law is described in section 401." In essence, section
401(a) says that notice must be placed on all publicly distributed
copies whenever the work is published. 8 However, there are consid-
erable saving clauses" regarding omissions and errors in notice. I
think we're going to have to advise our clients to place notice on the
work when it is publicly distributed, whatever that means.
Let's look at what is publication. Here I think you'll find the
problem that we're dealing with-copyright applied to the visual
73. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
74. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1976).
75. Mr. Sandison gave this speech in October of 1977 before the decision in Morseburg,
note 71, supra was rendered.
76. For a discussion of the "neighboring rights" concept see Phillips, Related Rights and
American Copyright Law: Compatible or Incompatible? 10 ASCAP CoPYmonr L. SYMP. 217
(1959).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
78. "Publication" is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) as:
the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute
copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution,
public performance, or public display, constitutes publication. A public perform-
ance or display of a work does not of itself constitute publication.
79. 17 U.S.C. §§ 405 - 406 (1976).
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arts. Under the old law, it was not at all clear whether exhibition of
a painting in a gallery or a museum constituted publication such as
to terminate common law copyright. Cases hold both ways. My
advice was always to place your copyright notice on your work be-
fore it leaves your studio. Otherwise, you're running into risks.
Let's look at the new definition of publication. Some have said
that this solves the problem; that this definition is so pellucid that
no problems can arise. I disagree. It does say in the last sentence
that "a public performance or display of a work does not of itself
constitute publication." 0 So far so good. Now I exhibit a painting
in a gallery; that is a public display, it is not a publication, as
defined by the statute. But let's read the prior sentence in that
definition. It says: "The offering to distribute copies or phonore-
cords . . . for purposes of further distribution, public performance,
or public display, constitutes publication."" In the definition of
copies,82 earlier on, you'll find that copies are material objects, and
that the term copies includes the material objects other than a
phonorecord in which the work is fixed." So copies here means the
original painting. Let's say we talk to the San Francisco Museum
of Modern Art about a show we'd like them to have, and we give
them some photographs of the art to be displayed in the show to
hang on the walls as advertisements. Is that not a publication as
defined here? Do we lose our common law protection? We may never
know.
Consider the first sentence, " '[p]ublication' is the distribution
of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership . . ."" If we offer to sell, or if we distribute
by sale an individual painting, is that a publication or not? If you
look at the definition of copies as including the original, then I think
it would be a publication. I don't claim to understand that section.
All I say is that it does not resolve the issue. In terms of practical
counseling we shall have to say to the artist, "assume that when it
leaves the studio you are running a considerable risk if you do not
80. Id. at § 101.
81. Id.
82. "Copies" is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) as:
material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method
now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reprod-
uced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.
83. Id.
84. See note 79, supra.
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place notice on it, subject to the saving provisions of omission and
error in the notice." So my advice remains: put the notice on.
What form should this notice take? Here we get into some real
aesthetic problems. That form is considered in section 401 (b),85 and
the position is considered in section 401(c)."6 Let's look at those
together. In subsection (b) we have three elements: the copyright
symbol," the year of first publication, 8 and the name of the copy-
right owner, or an abbreviation by which the name can be recog-
nized, or a generally known alternative designation." Under the old
law there was a form of optional notice or short form notice where
you could simply put your initials if the full name appeared some-
where else."o I think the intent was that you might initial the front
of your work and put the full name on the back. You could omit the
date as long as you put the full name on the back." These rules have
been tightened up. You can only omit the year date "where a pic-
torial, graphic or sculptural work . . . is reproduced on greeting
cards, postcards, stationery, jeweiry, dolls, toys, or any useful arti-
cles . . ."' The full, long notice is desirable for the visual artist and
desirable under the Universal Copyright Convention" (UCC), which
85. 17 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1976) states:
The notice appearing on the copies shall consist of the following three elements:
(1) the symbol @ (the letter C in a circle), or the word "Copyright", or the
abbreviation "Copr."; and
(2) the year of first publication of the work; in the case of compilations, or deriva-
tive works incorporating previously published material, the year date of first publi-
cation of the compilation or derivative work is sufficient. The year date may be
omitted where a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, with accompanying text
matter, if any, is reproduced in or on greeting cards, postcards, stationery, jewelry,
dolls, toys, or any useful articles; and
(3) the name of the owner of copyright in the work, or an abbreviation by which
the name can be recognized, or a generally known alternative designation of the
owner.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 401(c) (1976) states:
The notice shall be affixed to the copies in such manner and location as to give
reasonable notice of the claim of copyright. The Register of Copyrights shall pre-
scribe by regulation, as examples, specific methods of affixation and positions of
the notice on various types of works that will satisfy this requirement, but these
specifications shall not be considered exhaustive.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 401(b)(1) (1976).
88. Id. at § 401(b)(2).
89. Id. at § 401(b)(3).
90. 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1970).
91. Cf. Coventry Ware, Inc. v. Reliance Picture Frame Co. 288 F.2d 193, 195 (2d Cir. 1961).
92. 17 U.S.C. § 401(b)(2) (1976).
93. The Universal Copyright Convention was sponsored by the United Nations. It was
signed in Geneva on Sept. 6, 1952 and took effect on Sept. 15, 1955. Presently over 60
countries, including the United States, are members.
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requires all three elements." Where do we put the notice? Talk to
any visual artist and I will guarantee that not one of them wants to
put it on the front of a work, and many of them would rather go
without copyright protection than put notice on the front. I can't
agree with that because if you weigh what you're losing against what
you're gaining with copyright notice it's clearly to the advantage of
the artist to copyright. But you're still facing people who may be
working in solid colors or large canvases-you can understand the
aesthetic problems. So, the question is, is copyright notice on the
back of a work sufficient?
Let's consider Coventry Ware, Inc. v. Reliance Picture Frame
Co.," in which an ornamental plate with a copyright notice on the
back was on display on the wall. The court held that it was sufficient
to place notice on the back. This decision was consonant with the
view held by the copyright office, which, in its regulations, had
stated copyright notice on the back of fine art was sufficient notice."
I happen to think that Coventry Ware was wrongly decided. I be-
lieve the purpose of copyright notice is to give notice. Under the old
law, at least, it was clear that if the public did not get notice then
the purpose of the law was being undermined. You could argue it
both ways, but I still think it was unsafe under the old law to put
notice on the back of a painting.
Let's take a look at the new law. It says that the notice shall be
affixed . . . in such a manner and location as to give reasonable
notice; and that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe appropri-
ate regulations." I think that that certainly leaves room for the
Register to issue regulations permitting notice to appear on the back
of a painting. I think a regulation permitting this sort of notice
would be highly desirable."
A concept related to notice which is very important for visual
artists is "collective works."" Let's suppose that your painting is
reproduced in the San Francisco Chronicle, as part of a laudatory
review of your recent show by Alfred Frankenstein. The gallery has
94. 6 U.S.T. 2731, art. III.
95. See note 91, supra.
96. Id. at 195.
97. 17 U.S.C. § 401(c) (1976).
98. This rule has now been adopted in a Proposed Rulemaking issued by the Copyright
Office. See 42 Fed. Reg. 64,374 (1977).
99. "Collective work" is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) as: "a work, such as a periodical
issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate
and independent works in themselves, are assembled.
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provided the reviewer with publicity photographs of your paintings.
The old law said that the copyright notice in the name of the Chron-
icle Publishing Co. did not protect that painting. The artist could
only really gain protection either by making a full assignment of
rights to the publisher, giving him the right to publish in his own
name, with a subsequent transfer back to the artist (which is com-
plicated, and nobody would do it), or by requiring the publisher to
print the artist's own copyright notice underneath the reproduction
in the Chronicle. (Generally speaking, the Chronicle wouldn't do
either.) In my experience this is one of the most frequent areas in
which copyright protection is lost. We have a score of cases in the
BALA office in which copyright protection is lost. For example, this
occurs when murals are reproduced in newspapers without copy-
right notice. In fact, we got a letter from the Copyright Office
concerning a mural saying that the copyright had been lost, be-
cause, unfortunately, the artist had told them about the newspaper
reviews and shouldn't have done that.'oo
We have good news in' the new law under section 404.101 Also,
compare that with section 201(c).102 But under section 404 we find
that in a contribution to a collective work (in other words, a maga-
zine, or any work involving a number of contributions) copyright
notice in the name of the publisher, or a single notice that is de-
signed to protect the whole work, is sufficient for the protection of
each contribution. This rule is subject to the provision that an inno-
cent infringer will have a complete defense if he is misled by the fact
that the collective work did not have a copyright notice in the name
of the artist.0
Looking at section 201(c) we find that the copyright in a collective
work, or rather the copyright in each separate contribution to a
collective work, vests initially in the author.M So you don't have to
bother with transfers and assignments or separate copyright notice.
In the absence of an express transfer or assignment, the owner of the
copyright-let's say the magazine-"is presumed to have acquired
only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution
as part of that collective work." 0 That's going to be important not
only for authors who contribute to journals, but also to visual artists
100. Letter from Copyright Office to BALA (June 16, 1976).
101. 17 U.S.C. § 404 (1976).
102. Id. at § 201(c).
103. Id. at § 405(b).
104. Id. at § 201(c).
105. Id.
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whose work is reproduced, absent a contract, in art magazines or in
books. Of course artists should have a contract, but very often they
don't.
Lastly, under notice, sections 405 and 406 constitute some saving
graces for artists who don't put notice on their work.o'0 Contrast that
with the present law. Consider the Chicago Picasso case,'' Letter
Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Building Comm'n., in which
the great Picasso that's on display in Chicago-many of you have
probably seen it-was held to be in the public domain because
newspaper photographs of the maquette which was prepared for the
sculpture had been published without copyright notice. This was a
very, very harsh result, but theoretically correct. Under the old law
the distribution to the public of any copy of a work without copy-
right notice constituted publication and dedication of the work to
the public, resulting in a permanent loss of copyright protection.0 "
A tough case.
Under the new law, section 4059 provides that omission is not
fatal in three instances. First, the copyright is not invalidated if
notice has been omitted from a relatively small number of copies"0o
(I'm not sure how that will apply if there's only one painting in
question); second, if registration is made within five years,"' and a
reasonable effort is made to add notice to all copies; or third, if the
notice has been omitted in violation of an express requirement in
writing that the publicly distributed copies bear the prescribed no-
tice."' That's interesting. Let's suppose under the new law, you
write a letter to the Chronicle which says yes, you can reproduce my
painting in the entertainment section on the condition that it carries
my copyright notice. If they omit the notice, then that is a breach
of that express written requirement, and the artist is still protected.
But let's say the request to put notice is only an oral instruction:
then the artist is out of luck. The artists has still got to deal with
written instructions to magazines and newspapers if these don't
have their own copyright notice. Under section 405(b) there is a
common sense rule: the innocent infringer who is misled by the
106. Id. at §§ 405 - 406.
107. Letter Edged in Black, Inc. v. Public Building Comm'n., 320 F. Supp. 1303 (N.D. Ill.
1970).
108. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1947). The New Act does not revive copyright for any work that fell
into the public domain before Jan. 2, 1978. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(2) (1976).
109. 17 U.S.C. § 405 (1976).
110. Id. at § 405(a)(1).
111. Id. at § 405(a)(2).
112. Id. at § 405(a)(3).
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absence of notice has a complete defense. Under section 406113 there
are some similar rules for error in the name or the date. On the
whole these saving provisions do make it easier if you omit notice,
but still I think we must advise artists to place notice wherever the
Copyright Office says it has to be placed."'
Now, a little bit about deposit and registration."' I was interested
to hear the concern about the economic impact of deposit of motion
pictures. Well, the economic impact of the deposit of a unique
painting is catastrophic; it is, in fact, impossible. So under the old
law there was an optional deposit provision"' where you could send
photographs of your unique painting to fulfill the deposit require-
ment. Fine prints, however, were never covered under that optional
deposit provision, so you still have to send two copies of your fine
prints. This aroused a lot of legitimate concern.
Let's look at the new law. Deposit in general is covered under
section 407."' Again, like registration, to which it's conceptually
related, deposit is not a condition under the new law for copyright
protection."' There's an interesting provision that was put in as a
result of some pretty stiff lobbying in relation to fine prints: " . . .
where the individual author is the owner of copyright in a pictorial,
graphic, sculptural work and (i) less than five copies of the work
have been published, or (ii) the work has been published in a limited
edition consisting of numbered copies, the monetary value of which
would make the mandatory deposit of two copies of the best edition
of the work burdensome, unfair or unreasonable," then the Copy-
right Office regulations may provide either for complete exemption
from deposit or alternative forms of deposit."' That is obviously
similar to the optional deposit, and we're awaiting regulations
which, hopefully, will liberalize the situation.'20
A similar provision is reflected in section 408(c)"' which relates
to the registration requirements. Under section 408 registration is
113. Id. at § 406.
114. See note 99, supra.
115. 17 U.S.C. §§ 407 - 408, 411 - 412.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1947).
117. 17 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).
118. Id. at § 407(a). Deposit is a prerequisite for registration. 17 U.S.C. § 408(d) (1976).
Failure to deposit and register, though not fatal to copyright protection, limits remedies for
infringement. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 411 - 412 (1976).
119. 17 U.S.C. § 407(c) (1976).
120. These regulations have now been issued by the Copyright Office. See 43 Fed. Reg. 763
(1978).
121. 17 U.S.C. § 408(c) (1976).
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not a condition of copyright, but is permissive. Under 408(c)(1)'2
the Register is given power to create administrative classes and
may, by regulation, provide for the deposit of identifying material,
such as photographs, instead of the original. 2 1
But that still leaves open the final question, which is: Should an
artist register? Is it necessary? The burden is considerable for the
artist who is creating hundreds, maybe thousands, of prints, water-
colors, paintings, or even just a small number of sculptures. Regis-
tration eats up time and money. Time must be spent on paperwork
and making photographs, assuming photographs are acceptable as
deposit copies. Money must be spent on the registration fee. So I've
said to artists, up until now, "Don't register until you have to sue,
because then you must register in order to go to court. You run
certain risks; it's going to be harder to prove you're the copyright
owner, but registration is not mandatory; don't worry about regis-
tering your copyright until the 28th year when you want to renew, 12
and you have to have your registration number."
Let's look at the new law. I'm going to change my tune. Registra-
tion under section 411125 is a prerequisite to an infringement suit
(that's the same as the present law), but under section 412 registra-
tion is a prerequisite to recovering either statutory damages or attor-
ney's fees.126 Now if you're an artist and you want to sue to enforce
your copyright and you cannot obtain either the statutory minimum
damages or the attorney fees, I don't think you have much of a legal
right to enforce. It's going to be very hard to prove actual damages;
you're probably going to have to rely on the statutory minimum
damages. Secondly, you're not going to find an attorney who'll take
a case without attorney fees unless he's doing it pro bono for BALA.
But even our BALA panel lawyers cannot absorb court costs, cannot
absorb lengthy trial work. The new law requires that you register if
you are to have these remedies of statutory minimum damages and
attorney's fees. In the case of an unpublished work you must register
at once, as damages or attorney fees will not be awarded for acts of
infringement occurring before registration.'1 With respect to pub-
122. See note 118, supra.
123. 43 Fed. Reg. 765 (1978). For most works of the visual arts, the regulations permit
deposit of identifying material. Id.
124. Copyrights in the first term on Jan. 1, 1978, must be reserved in order to secure a
second term of 47 years (for a total of 75 years). 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1976).
125. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1976). See note 118, supra.
126. Id. at § 412.
127. Id. at § 412(1).
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lished works you must register within three months of publication
or you are denied these remedies."' As of January 1, my advice is
to register immediately: in the case of unpublished works if you
want to have an effective remedy, or in the case of published works
register within three months if you want to enforce your rights.
The requirement of registration, I fear, is an undue burden on the
visual artist. I think it goes back to the historical roots, in the book
publishing industry where the publisher had no qualms about send-
ing in two copies of the book. But that requirement as it applies to
the visual artist is plainly unfair, burdensome, and unnecessary. I
always reflect that in England it's not necessary to deposit anything
to obtain copyright protection. And of course for a foreigner who
wishes to seek copyright protection in this country it is not necessary
to deposit.' I wonder why we treat out visual artists worse than we
treat foreigners. With that I'll close. Thank you.
128. Id. at § 412(2).
129. Foreign artists whose works are copyrighted in their own countries are protected by
United States copyright law if their countries are parties to the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion. See 17 U.S.C. § 104(b)(2) (1976).
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